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The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D. C. 20505

18 June 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable William P. Clark
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs

SUBJECT: President's Meeting with Prime Minister Begin

In response to the questions in your 17 June 1982 letter re the President's meeting with Prime Minister Begin:

1. In principle, I do not believe US forces should participate in a peacekeeping force in Lebanon unless that were the only way to bring it about. My reasons follow:

- Despite Israeli desires for it, they do not demand it.
- Given our close Israeli ties in the eyes of the Arabs, it would make our troops and the force generally appear as surrogates for the Israelis. They are more politically acceptable alternatives.
- Our involvement would render the force more of a target for continued Palestinian acts of terror in Lebanon.
- The French seem to be evincing a desire to assume a meaningful role, and their lead would do no harm to our interest.
- It would encourage a demand by the Soviets for participation or an offsetting presence in Syria.

2. I do not believe the United States should link assistance to Lebanon to Israeli concessions. We should work for a revitalization of Lebanon as an important purpose in itself and insist that Israel and Syria withdraw to make Lebanon whole. Israeli concessions on other issues should be required under pain of withholding US support on security assistance and other matters. The Israeli concessions which should be sought are: progress in Palestinian autonomy, other measures to extend opportunities for dignity and peaceful existence to Palestinians, support and acquiescence in security and political relationships with moderate Arab governments.

3. F-16 sales and the provisions of ammunition and spare parts should go forward as "business as usual" only if Israel commits to cooperation in developing autonomy for Palestinians and accepting our security relationships with moderate Arab governments.

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
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4. We should inform the Israelis that the security of Jordan is in US interest and we are proceeding with sales of aircraft. We should also inform them that further sales will occur down the road of more sophisticated equipment.

5. Our posture in the United Nations needs to be determined on a case-by-case basis but if Israel is at fault and the sanctions proposed are considered excessive we should abstain rather than veto which creates the impression that we are willing to approve anything which Israel does.

6. We should undertake humanitarian relief efforts to relieve the suffering and damage resulting from the Israeli drive into Lebanon.

7. We should coordinate more closely with the allies. In Lebanon, this means effectively enlisting French assistance to bring about stability and a strong central government. On autonomy, this means we should enlist their efforts and pressure in bringing about a wider definition of autonomy than Israel currently desires.



William J. Casey

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